Privacy concerns are becoming more important as more personal data moves online. It is therefore of interest to develop versions of data-processing algorithms which can be guaranteed to preserve the privacy of individuals' data. A general method for creating a privacy-preserving version of a convex optimization problem is described, along with applications to machine learning, statistics, and resource allocation problems.
Introduction
With the increasing reliance on computers and the internet for daily activities, we now have vast amounts of data about many aspects of people's lives. As a result, the question of how to process and use this information, while still ensuring the privacy of the individuals in this dataset, has acquired immense practical importance. There are many components to the privacy problem, including, access control and privacy-preserving datarelease, in this paper, we study a different problem -how to compute and release certain functions of the data, while still preserving the privacy of individuals in the dataset.
More specifically, we consider the problem of solving a convex optimization problem, when the function to be optimized depends on the private data of individuals. Our goal is to compute a solution in a way that preserves the privacy of the individuals participating in the dataset, by making it difficult for an adversary to infer entries in the dataset from the solution. This idea arises in many settings, for example, classification. In classification, we are given n labelled data points (x(i), y(i)) where x(i) is a data point in R d and y(i) is a label in the set {−1, +1}, and the goal is to compute a rule y = f (x) that will predict y correctly on instances drawn from the same distribution as the input data. Such a rule is frequently computed by finding a function which has low loss. An example of privacy-preserving classification is when the x(i) represents medical data of patients, and y(i) represents whether patient i has a specific disease; in this case, while we would like to find a rule that helps us detect whether a patient has the disease, we would also like to preserve the privacy of patients in the dataset used to compute the rule.
What do we mean by preserving privacy ? We use the ǫ-differential privacy model of Dwork et. al [7] . This is a very strong notion of privacy, which requires that the output of an algorithm be essentially unchanged, with respect to changes in the private value of any single individual in the dataset. Intuitively, this means that by observing the output of an algorithm that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, the knowledge gained by an adversary is the same, regardless of the private value of any single individual in the dataset.
The sensitivity method [7] accomplishes this by adding noise to the output of a non-private algorithm. In the context of optimization, this means minimizing the objective function and then adding noise to the minimizer. Chaudhuri and Monteleoni [4] showed that for classification using logistic regression, adding noise to the objective function and then minimizing results in better generalization performance. This has recently been extended in [14] to a support-vector machine classifier. A different perspective on privacy preserving convex optimization can be found in [1] .
In this paper we generalize the methods in [4, 14] to algorithms which take the form of general convex optimization problems satisfying certain conditions. The objective function J(f ; D) takes the form of a regularized loss minimization L(f ; D) + N (f ), in which the loss function L(f ; D) is data dependent and the regularizer N (f ) is not. Given some convexity and differentiability requirements on L, N , and J, we provide a privacy-preserving form of these algorithms by perturbing J(f ; D) and then performing the optimization. We furthermore describe two additional applications for this framework beyond classification, namely in density estimation and resource allocation.
In the next section we describe the model, privacy definitions, and some examples of applications satisfying our conditions. We then provide the general algorithm and its analysis.
Convex programs and assumptions
In this paper we study how to create privacy-preserving versions of regularized convex optimization programs. Regularization is a method for solvint ill-poser learning learning problems, and is a part of many popular algorithms such as ridge regression, the Lasso, and support vector machines. The privacy model that we use is the ǫ-differential privacy model of Dwork et al. [6, 7] . In a sense, regularization and privacy go hand-inhand, since both are attempts to "smooth" the output of a convex optimization. In regularization, the aim is to prevent overfitting; our privacy algorithm aims to mask the effect of individual data points.
Convex optimization problems
In this note we are interested in designing privacy-preserving versions of algorithms which are defined by a regularized convex optimization program over a data set D = {z i : i ∈ [n]}, where z i ∈ Z. Such an optimization can be expressed as the minimization of an objective function
where L(f , D) is loss function for the output f on the underlying data D and N (·) is a regularization term.
is said to be strictly convex if for all f and g,
It can be shown that a strictly convex function has a unique minima. [2] Definition 2. A function H(f ) over f ∈ R d is said to be λ-strongly convex, if, for all f and g,
Assumptions 1. We will make some assumptions on (1) for our algorithm to be privacy-preserving. 
2. The regularizer N (f ) is convex.
The objective function J(f ) is a strictly convex.
If we also know that J(f ) is λ-strongly convex we can prove additional bounds on the loss in utility from our algorithm.
We observe that for the privacy guarantees to hold, we do not require any condition on N (f ) other than convexity; in particular, provided J(f ) is strictly convex, N (f ) can be non-differentiable (which includes L 1 -regularizers) and N (f ) can even be 0 (which includes no regularization). This is in contrast with previous sensitivity-based methods, which require N (f ) to be strongly convex.
A second observation is that although our results do not allow for non-differentiable loss-functions, one can always approximate a loss-function L which is non-differentiable at a finite number of points, by another differentiable loss-function L ′ . For example, the hinge loss is not differentiable, but it can be approximated by the differentiable Huber loss. In practice, such approximations are unlikely to cause significant loss in performance.
Applications
Before describing our algorithm, we will discuss a few applications which fall into our our framework.
Classification
The approach described here came out of two earlier algorithms for support vector machines described in [4, 14] . In this setting the data takes values in
Training a classifier can be done by minimizing the regularized empirical risk objective:
In [4] the case of classification using logistic regression was studied. In this setting we take the loss function to be
In [14] the problem of support-vector machine classification was studied using the Huber loss [3] , which is a proxy for the hinge loss typically used in the SVM algorithm:
The reason for using the Huber loss is that it is differentiable, satisfying our first assumption. In both cases, the training algorithm uses an ℓ 2 regularizer and the overall objective function is strictly convex. Furthermore, J(f ) is λ-strongly convex, so we can derive generalization error bounds for these algorithms.
Density estimation
In this model the underlying data D = {z i } takes values in some finite set Z and there are feature functions φ j : Z → R for j = 1, 2, . . . , d. We will assume the feature functions are bounded, so |φ j (z)| ≤ 1 for all j and z ∈ Z. The goal is to find estimate an underlying distribution P on Z, assuming that {z i } was sampled from P . The empirical distributionP
may be far from P , but the feature functions should be concentrated, so E P [φ j (z)] should be close to EP [φ j (z)]. One approach to finding a distribution consistent with the observed means EP [φ j (z)] is regularized maximum entropy [5] , which tries to find the Gibbs distribution of the form
with maximum entropy, where ζ(f ) is a normalizing constant. The entropy maximization is performed subject to the consistency constraints
The corresponding optimization problem is to minimize
If we set L(f ;
Λ j |f j | we can quickly verify the assumptions. First, we can take the gradient of L(f ; D):
Since
we have
Thus the loss is continuous. It is clear that N (f ) is convex, so we must show that the objective J(f ) is strictly convex. Since N (f ) is not strictly convex, it suffices to show the loss is strictly convex. We can take the Hessian:
This is positive definite as long as the feature functions are linearly independent.
Resource allocation
Since the seminal work of Kelly et al. [10, 11] , there has been a significant amount of interest in pricing and auction mechanisms for allocating bandwidth in networks [8, 9, 17] . For a single link on which users are competing for bandwidth, the resource manager would like to allocate a vector of rates f
where we assume each U i is concave and differentiable. The data z i can be thought of as parameters governing the user's utility function. For example, U i (f ; z i ) = log(1 + f i /z i ) is a possible utility function. The regularization term comes via the cost assessed to the system manager for allocating f to the users. This takes the form of a convex cost function N (f ) = N ( f 1 ).
If the users submit their true utility functions, the overall optimization problem can be written in the form of equation (1). If the utility function is strictly concave then the objective is convex. Furthermore, if the utility function is grows at most linearly then the condition (4) will be satisfied. Thus the centralized resource allocation problem fits within our framework. This problem can often be solved in a decentralized manner using a bidding mechanism. We note that a differential-privacy approach for auctions has also been investigated by McSherry and Talwar [13] .
Privacy model
We are interested in producing an output f that preserves the privacy of individual entries of the database D. The notion of privacy we use is the ǫ-differential privacy model, developed by Dwork et.al [6, 7] . In this model, the algorithm is randomized. Let M denote the algorithm and let M(D) be the random variable that is the output and let µ denote the density of M. The algorithm M is said to preserve ǫ-differential privacy if the likelihood that M produces a solution f on database D is close to the likelihood of it producing f on any database D ′ that differs from D in one entry. Intuitively, this means that by observing the output of an algorithm that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, the knowledge gained by an adversary is the same, regardless of the private value of any single individual in the dataset.
Definition 3. An algorithm M provides ǫ-differential privacy if for any two databases D and D
′ that differ in a single entry and for any f ,
That is, by observing the output of an algorithm that satisfies ǫ p -differential privacy, the knowledge gained by an adversary is almost the same, (within a factor of e ǫp ) regardless of the private value of any single individual in the dataset.
Unlike many other definitions of privacy, this definition is very strong. In fact, it was shown in [7] that if an algorithm M obeys ǫ p -differential privacy, then, even an adversary who knows the private values of all but one person in the database, and has some arbitrary prior knowledge about this last person's value, will not be able to gain much extra confidence (beyond her prior knowledge) about the last person's value, from the output of the mechanism. Another advantage of using differential-privacy is that unlike some of the other definitions [12, 16] , the mechanisms are more amenable to mathematical analysis, and it is relatively easy to bound the privacy/utility tradeoff.
Proposed algorithm
Two approaches have been proposed for creating privacy-preserving algorithms from (1). The first, known as the sensitivity method [7] , is a general method for generating a privacy-preserving version of any function A(D) based on the sensitivity of the function A(·). For the function A(D) = argmin J(f , D), the sensitivity method would output a A(D) + a, where a is random noise with density
and α is a normalizing constant. The parameter β is a function of the sensitivity of A(·). The interested reader is referred to [7] for the details. Adding noise to the output of A(·) has the effect of masking the effect of any particular data point. However, in some applications the sensitivity of the minimizer argmin J(f , D) may be quite high, which would require the sensitivity method to add significantly more noise. A different approach, first proposed by [4] , is to add noise to the objective function itself and then produce the minimizer of the perturbed objective. That is, we can minimize
where b has density ν(b) with parameter β = ǫ p . 
The algorithm

Analysis
The conditions under which the solution to convex program (19) is privacy-preserving is summarized by the following theorem. 
Proof. We first observe that the strict convexity of J(f ) implies that the convex program (1) has a unique solution. In addition, since J(f ) is strictly convex, J priv (f ) = J(f ) + b T f is also strictly convex, and as a result, the convex program (19) also has a unique solution.
Let D and D ′ be any two databases that differ in one person's private value. Then,
where
is the probability that f priv is output as a solution to convex program (19) when the input is D, and b = v. By definition of f priv , and from the strict convexity of J(f ), P[f priv |D, v] = 1, when v is a subgradient of J(f priv ) + b T v and is 0 otherwise. In the sequel, we show that the ratio of the two integrals in the right hand side of (21) is bounded by e ǫp . This will imply that the solution to (19) is ǫ p -differentially private. To do this, we will show that there is a bijection from R d to itself associating each v 1 with a unique v 2 such that
If such a bijection exists, then from (21) we get
We now consider two cases depending on whether the regularizer N (f ) is differentiable or not. If N (f ) is differentiable at f priv , then we can differentiate the objective function in (19) and set it to 0:
Thus we can see each solution induces a unique pair (v 1 , v 2 ), where
Taking the difference we get
and hence, from our assumptions we have
Observe that for any v,
, where Vol(r) denotes the surface area of the sphere of radius r in d dimensions. We can therefore write:
, the ratio of the densities at v 1 and v 2 is at most e ǫp . The theorem follows for this case. Now suppose that N (f ) is not differentiable at f priv , and let S(f priv ) ( resp. T (f priv )) denote the set of subgradients of N (f ) (resp. J priv (f )) at f priv . Then, by the additivity property of sub-gradients [15] ,
We note that in this case, 
and is 0 otherwise. We can now set up a one-to-one correspondence between (v 1 , v 2 ) pairs as follows: for each u ∈ S(f priv ), let
Since, for all such pairs, again,
, the argument follows in the same way as in the case where N (f ) is differentiable at f priv .
We observe from the proof argument that this Theorem does not necessarily hold when L(f , D) is nondifferentiable, and the location of the point of non-differentiability depends on the data. In such a case, we cannot necessarily set up a one-to-one correspondence between v 1 and v 2 , and as a result the ratio of the integrals may not be bounded. See Section 4.1 for an example.
Next, we show that if J(f ) is strongly convex, then, we can show that the solution f priv to convex program (19) is not much worse than f . To be more precise, Theorem 2. If J(f ) is λ-strongly convex, then for any given f * , with probability 1 − δ,
Proof. To show this theorem, we first show that if N (f ) is λ-strongly convex, then,
From the strong convexity of J(f ), and the optimality of f * , we can write:
Rearranging, it follows that:
Similarly, fron the strong convexity of J priv (f ), and the optimality of f priv , we can write:
The objective function should be strictly convex
The requirement that the objective function is strictly convex ensures that the convex program always has a unique solution. If the convex program does not have a unique solution, then, selecting any arbitrary solution from the solution set can violate differential-privacy guarantees. One way to address this is to sample from the set of solutions of the convex program; however, we need to ensure that this sampling procedure also ensures that differential-privacy is preserved.
Discussion
In this paper we gave a general method for making the output of a convex optimization problem privacypreserving. The key idea was to perturb the objective function and then minimize. Although we had to impose several assumptions on our convex program, these assumptions are satisfied in several problems of interest in machine learning, inference, and resource allocation.
• Training a classifier on labeled examples is often done via regularized empirical risk minimization. In this setting, our algorithm can be used to produce a classifier such that an adversary who observes the classifier gains the same knowledge, regardless of the private value of any single individual in the dataset.
• In density estimation problems, the data consists of feature vectors generated from an underlying class. In order to prevent overfitting, a regularized maximum entropy estimation procedure can produce a distribution on the underlying space that is consistent with the observations. In this setting, our algorithm can be used to provide a density estimate, while still maintaining the privacy of the individuals in the dataset.
• In network resource allocation, a centralized operator tries to maximize the surplus between the users' utilities and the costs of the allocation. In this setting, it may not be desirable for the allocation to reveal too much about the individual users' utilities. The centralized operator can produce an allocation that preserves privacy. It would be of great interest to see if such an allocation can be done via the decentralized auction mechanisms studied in recent works [8] [9] [10] [11] 17] .
Privacy considerations are becoming increasingly important as more and more personal data moves online and algorithms for processing and learning from this data become more efficient. The ǫ-differential privacy criterion is a powerful framework within which we can examine the different privacy guarantees provided by algorithms. As more applications emerge, it will be interesting to develop new techniques for privatizing algorithms used in practice. The algorithm given here is a small step towards developing more general privacy-preserving optimization procedures.
